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Note
OHIO'S EXCEPTION TO CONSENT IN ADOPTION
PROCEEDINGS: A NEED FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Under Ohio law, both natural parents must consent to their child's adoption by
another. However, according to Section 310Z07(A) of the Ohio Revised Code a nat-
ural parent's consent rights may be forfeit when that parent has failed without just
cause to communicate with, or provide maintenance and support for, the child for a
period of one year. This Note demonstrates that the judicial interpretations of this
section have rendered it meaningless by requiring the virtual "abandonment" of the
child before parental consent rights can be waived. These interpretations are directly
contrary to the legislative intent that, in this section, the interests of the child be
paramount to the rights of the parent In order to remedy this situation, the Note
suggests a new Section 3107O7(A). This new section properly balances the rights of
the parents, the needs of the child, and the interests of the state in providing a method
by which parental consent rights can be deemed waived when the circumstances so
warrant
INTRODUCTION
IMAGINE THE following scenario: A man and a woman get
married and have a child. Later, for one of any number of rea-
sons, the couple gets a divorce. Under the terms of the divorce de-
cree the mother gets custody' of the child, and the father is required
to pay a certain amount of child support every month.2 Still later,
1. It is only for convenience that the mother, instead of the father, of the child in this
hypothetical is granted custody and remarries, with the stepfather wishing to adopt the child.
Whether the father or mother is granted custody of the child depends on the best interests of
the child based on the surrounding circumstances.
When a husband and wife are living apart and seek the care, custody and control of their
offspring, they stand in equality as far as parenthood is involved. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.03 (Page 1983). The court decides who gets custody of the children. The court must
take into account the best interest of the child, and shall consider all relevant factors, includ-
ing: (1) the parent's wishes; (2) the wishes of a child who is 11-years-old or older, (3) the
child's interaction and interrelation with his parents, siblings and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's interest; (4) the child's adjustment to his home, school and
community; (5) the mental and physical health of all of the parties involved. Id § 3109.04.
2. The relevant factors utilized by a court in making a judicial decree with regard to
child support are set forth in the Ohio Revised Code and include:
(1) the financial resources of the child; (2) the financial resources and needs of the
custodial parent and non-custodial parent, when the custody is not joint; (3) the
standard of living that the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not ended;
(4) the physical and emotional needs of the child and his educational needs; (5) the
financial needs and resources of both parents, if custody is joint; (6) the educational
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the mother remarries, and her new husband, with her consent,
wishes to adopt her child
Under current Ohio law, in order for the new husband to adopt
his wife's child, the family must go through a two-step adoption
proceeding.' First, the court makes an inquiry into the issue of con-
sent. Unless a statutory exception applies, both natural parents
must consent to the adoption.6 It is only after the question of con-
sent has been resolved that the court investigates the issue of the
best interests of the child.' Thus, under normal circumstances, if
the natural father refused to give his consent in the above scenario,
the adoption petition would be denied before the court ever ex-
amined the question of the best interests of the child.
However, the Ohio Revised Code prescribes certain circum-
needs and the educational opportunities that would have been available had the
circumstances requiring the court order not arisen. The court shall include a provi-
sion that one or both of the parents provide for the child's health care needs. In
addition the court can establish visitation rights.
Id. § 3109.05.
3. The following is a brief synopsis of the basic procedural requirements for adoption in
Ohio as set forth in Chapter 3107 of the Code.
The stepparent (or petitioner) begins by filing a petition for adoption in the court in the
county where the minor to be adopted was born or resides, or in the county where the peti-
tioner or the parent of the minor resides. The petition must include, among other things,
basic information concerning the minor and the petitioner, as well as the financial status of
the petitioner and his or her ability to provide for the well-being of the minor.
A petition for adoption also requires the written consent of the parents of the minor to be
adopted and of the minor, if over the age of twelve years, unless the court determines that the
consent of the latter is unnecessary. In certain limited circumstances, the consent of a parent
is not necessary.
After the petition is filed, the court will set a hearing and notice will be given by the court
to all interested parties. The department of human services, an agency, or other court-ap-
pointed person will then conduct an investigation to determine whether the adoptive home is
suitable for the minor to be adopted. A written report of the investigation will include a
recommendation as to the granting or denial of the petition and will also be filed in court
prior to the date of the hearing.
Ordinarily, the petitioner and the minor to be adopted must attend the hearing. If, at the
conclusion of the hearing(s), the court determines that all requirements have been met and
that the adoption is in the best interest of the minor, it may issue a final decree of adoption or
interlocutory order of adoption; however, this decree will not be issued until at least six
months after the filing of the petition and until the minor has lived in the adoptive home for
at least six months. Id. §§ 3107.01-19.
4. In re Adoption of Salisbury, 5 Ohio App. 3d 65, 65, 449 N.E.2d 519, 521 (1981).
The effects of a final decree of adoption are: (1) the natural parents are relieved of all parental
rights and responsibilities and all legal relationships between the adoptee and his relatives are
terminated such that the child becomes a stranger to the relatives for all purposes, including
inheritance; and (2) the relationship of parent and child is created between the adopter and
adoptee. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.05.
5. Salisbury, 5 Ohio App. 3d at 65, 449 N.E.2d at 521.
6. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06(A)-(B).
7. Salisbury, 5 Ohio App. 3d at 65, 449 N.E.2d at 521.
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stances in which the requirement of parental consent can be disre-
garded.' One of these circumstances is set forth in Ohio Revised
Code § 3107.07(A), which provides:
Consent to adoption is not required of any of the following:
(A) A parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption
petition and the court finds after. . . hearing, that theparent has
failed without justifiable cause to communicate with the minor or
to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as re-
quired by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year
immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition .... 9
This Note discusses section 3107.07(A) and what constitutes
communication with, and provision of maintenance and support
for, a child. It provides a brief synopsis of background material
concerning adoption in Ohio,1 sets forth the distinguishing factors
between section 3107.07(A) and its immediate predecessor,11 and
makes an inquiry into the effects of the interpretations of section
3107.07(A) by three Ohio appellate court cases. 12 It demonstrates
how those decisions have rendered this section virtually meaning-
less by interpreting the statute to signify that the virtual "abandon-
ment" of a child is necessary before the requirement of parental
consent can be ignored. 3 In addition, the significance of a recent
Ohio Supreme Court case, which in effect approves the lower court
interpretations, is investigated. 4 Finally, this Note suggests alter-
native language for a new section 3107.07(A) which, if enacted,
would cure the problems that the judicial interpretations of section
3107.07(A) have engendered. 5
I. BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the right of
a natural parent in the custody, care and control of his children is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment.16  However, that right is not inalienable.1 7 As the Ohio
8. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.07.
9. Id. § 3107.07(A) (emphasis added).
10. See infra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 41-57 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 58-163 and accompanying text.
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 164-97 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
16. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (the Court traditionally recog-
nizes that "freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty inter-
est protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550
(1965) (due process requires that in a parental termination proceeding, notice and a hearing
[Vol 36:348
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Supreme Court stated:
While the rights of the natural parents should always have full
consideration, and be carefully guarded and protected, the rights
and interests of the child are paramount, and, where there is a
conflict between the rights of the parent and the interests of the
child, the state may act by and through appropriate legislation.
1 8
Thus, while all of the states have adoption statutes that require the
natural parents' consent before an adoption can take place,19 those
same statutes also provide for certain circumstances in which the
promotion of the child's welfare mandates that the requirement of
parental consent be ignored.20 Ohio Revised Code § 3107.07(A) is
such a provision. It provides that a parent's consent will not be
needed in an adoption proceeding if that parent fails to communi-
cate with, or to provide maintenance and support for, his child for
one year without justifiable cause.21
II. THE STATUTORY EVOLUTION OF OHIO'S EXCEPTION TO
CONSENT PROVISION
In order to fully appreciate this Note's discussion of the current
state of Ohio law, a review of the history of Ohio's adoption stat-
ute, as it relates to dispensing with the requirement of parental con-
sent, is necessary. This presentation will trace the significant
changes that have occurred from the first statute, which used the
term "abandoned, ' 22 to the present statute, from which this term
was omitted.23
A. 1859-1921. Original Language
The first adoption statute in Ohio was passed on March 29,
1859.24 That statute required consent by the natural parents before
must be provided because "the result of the judicial proceeding [would be] ... permanently
to deprive a legitimate parent of all that parenthood implies").
17. Initially, the common law did not recognize adoption "because the rights and duties
of parents were inalienable." Infausto, Perspective on Adoption, THE ANNALS OF THE AMER-
ICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: PROGRESS IN FAMILY LAW 1, 1-4
(1969). It was not until the introduction of adoption statutes that adoption became a legally
recognized practice. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues and Laws 1958-1983, 17 FAM. L.Q.
173, 175 (1983).
18. State ex reL Booth v. Robinson, 120 Ohio St. 91, 95, 165 N.E. 574, 576 (1929).
19. Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE
L.. 715, 726-27 (1950).
20. Id.
21. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A).
22. 1859 Ohio Laws 82, 83.
23. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A).
24. 1859 Ohio Laws 82, 83.
19851
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an adoption could take place.z5 However, it specifically provided
that if a child was "abandoned," the consent of the parent who
abandoned the child would not be necessary.2 6
From 1859 through 1921, this statute went through a variety of
changes and codifications.27 After each change, "abandoned" re-
mained one of the grounds for dispensing with the requirement of
parental consent.28 Unfortunately, at no time did the statute define
what circumstances constituted "abandonment" of a child, and
Ohio has no case law which establishes such a definition. 9 Other
states, however, have developed a definition of the term "aban-
doned" as used in their own adoption statutes.3" A survey of the
cases in those states reveals the definition to be "any conduct on the
part of a parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all paren-
tal duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child."'" This
will be the definition of "abandoned" for purposes of this Note.
B. 1921-1977: Statutory Contraction and then
Expansion of the Exception
In 1921, the word "abandoned" was deleted from the Ohio
adoption statute; no comparable term was put in its place.32 This
had the effect of making parental consent practically indispensable,
because the statute required some positive act, such as voluntary
surrender of the child to an adoption institution, before the require-
ment could be disregarded.33
The year 1931 marked the passage of a new probate code in
Ohio, including a new adoption statute.34 As was the case in 1921,
the word "abandoned" was omitted.35 However, the new statute
lessened the severity of the 1921 statute by providing that the re-
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, eg., 1870 Ohio Laws 14, 14; 1911 Ohio Laws 305, 305.
28. In re Adoption of Wedl, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 231, 233, 114 N.E.2d 311, 312 (P. Ct.
1952).
29. Id.
30. Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 662 (1954).
31. Wedl, 65 Ohio L. Abs. at 234, 114 N.E.2d at 312. This language originally appeared
in the case of Winams v. Luppie, 47 N.J. Eq. 302, 305, 20 A. 969, 970 (1890). For an exten-
sive listing of the cases adopting this language, see Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 662 (1954). See also
NEv. Rnv. STAT. § 128.012(1) (1979) (abandonment constitutes "any conduct of one or both
parents of a child which evinces a settled purpose on the part of one or both parents to forego
all parental custody and relinquish all claims to the child.").
32. Wedl, 65 Ohio L. Abs. at 234, 114 N.E.2d at 312; 1921 Ohio Laws 177, 177-81.
33. Wed!, 65 Ohio L. Abs. at 234-35, 114 N.E.2d at 313.
34. Id; 1931 Ohio Laws 471, 471.
35. Wedl, 65 Ohio L. Abs. at 235, 114 N.E.2d at 313; 1931 Ohio Laws 471, 472.
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quirement of parental consent could be ignored if that parent
"failed or refused to support the child for two consecutive years."
36
This language established two situations in which a parent's right to
withhold consent to an adoption would be forfeit: (1) by actively
refusing to provide support when asked or ordered to do so; or (2)
by passively failing to provide child support.37
The language of the statute remained the same until 1943 when
"failed or refused to support" was replaced with "willfully ne-
glected."' 38 The following year, the language was changed again,
becoming, "willfully failed to properly support and maintain.
39
This language was unaltered until 1977 when the Ohio General As-
sembly enacted the present statute, Revised Code § 3107.07(A).'4
Note that none of these changes involved a reintroduction of the
word "abandoned."
C. 1977- Ohio's Current Provision
In 1977, the Ohio legislature enacted the present provision, Re-
vised Code § 3107.07(A), which states that parental consent to an
adoption is unnecessary when a parent has "failed -without justifi-
able cause to communicate with the minor or to provide for the
maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or judicial
decree for a period of at least one year ... ."I' A review of the
components of the current statute discloses substantial differences
from prior law.42
The first change made by the enactment of Revised Code
§ 3107.07(A) involved an addition to the obligations which a parent
must fulfill in order to maintain his consent rights. Not only must a
parent maintain and support the child, but he must also communi-
cate with him.4a Failure of either of these requirements can result
in the forfeiture of parental consent rights.' Prior statutes did not
contain a communication requirement; the parent's only obligation
36. Wedl, 65 Ohio L. Abs. at 235, 114 N.E.2d at 313; 1931 Ohio Laws 471, 472.
37. Wedl, 65 Ohio L. Abs. at 235, 114 N.E.2d at 313; 1931 Ohio Laws 471, 472.
38. 1943 Ohio Laws 434, 437.
39. 1945 Ohio Laws 448, 451.
40. 1976 Ohio Laws 1839, 1845.
41. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A).
42. See In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St. 3d 361, 366, 481 N.E.2d 613, 619
(1985).
43. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A).
44. See In re McDermitt, 63 Ohio St. 2d 301, 304, 408 N.E.2d 680, 682-83 (1980) (it is
not necessary to prove both a failure to communicate and a failure to support and maintain;
failure of either can result in the forfeiture of parental consent rights).
1985]
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was to "support and maintain" the child.45 Thus, it is apparent that
the new statute was meant to require more from a parent than did
prior statutes.
The second change concerns a shortening of the time span in-
volved before a parent's consent rights are considered to have been
waived. The present statute provides that when there has been a
failure to communicate with or provide support for a child for one
year, parental consent is not needed. 4 In contrast, the prior statute
required the failure to have occurred for two years. 7
The third change made by the new statute is in the standard of
culpability. Under the new statute, any "failure" that is "without
justifiable cause" can result in loss of parental consent rights.4a In
contrast, prior statutes had a standard of "willfullness."4 9 Whether
the new standard of culpability requires more of the parent than did
the old standard may be debatable. Nevertheless, the two standards
are not comparable.5 Under the new statute, a parent can willfully
fail to support a child, but that parent will not lose parental consent
rights if there was justifiable cause to do so. On the other hand, a
negligent or reckless failure would not have met the prior standard,
while currently such a failure will result in the forfeiture of parental
consent rights if it is without justifiable cause.
The fourth change made by the new statute is in the method of
judging the sufficiency of the maintenance, support and communi-
cation which has been provided by the noncustodial parent. Section
3107.07(A) requires maintenance, support and communication to
be made "as required by law or judicial decree."51 Earlier law dic-
tated that the consent of a parent would be forfeit only if the parent
failed "properly" to support and maintain the child;5 2 in other
45. In re Adoption of Hupp, 9 Ohio App. 3d 128, 130, 458 N.E.2d 878, 882 (1982)
("failure to communicate" is new to the statute).
46. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A).
47. 1945 Ohio Laws 448, 451. One interesting note: when the word "abandoned" was
part of the statute, no time period was established. Thus, the legislature allowed the judiciary
to determine the point at which abandonment occurred. However, once "abandoned" was
taken out of the statute, this time span was statutorily fixed. In 1931, the time period was
first set at two years. 1931 Ohio Laws 471, 472. It was not until the present statute was
passed that the time period was lowered to one year. 1976 Ohio Laws 1839, 1845.
48. OHfo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A).
49. See McDermitt, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 305, 408 N.E.2d at 683.
50. Compare McDermitt, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 305-06, 408 N.E.2d at 683, with Hupp, 9
Ohio App. 3d at 131, 458 N.E.2d at 883.
51. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A). See also McDermitt, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 305,
408 N.E.2d at 683.
52. See 1945 Ohio Laws 448, 451.
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words, "that which is appropriate to all of the circumstances of the
child's life situation."53 The question of what was "proper" was
thus a question of fact.54 By omitting the adjective "properly" and
avoiding the subjective application and analysis that this term en-
genders, the new statute establishes a more objective standard of
determining what amount of maintenance and support is required.
If the parent fails to provide the minimum amount of child support
mandated by a judicial decree,55 it automatically constitutes failure
to support. If, however, no prior judicial decree exists, the tribunal
must ascertain the necessary amount based on the facts of the case
and the appropriate precedent. As such, the sufficiency of the main-
tenance and support provided by the noncustodial parent is no
longer left entirely to the opinion of the presiding judge.56
Finally, it is important to note that the new statute maintains a
fifty-six-year tradition; the term "abandoned" continues to be omit-
ted from use.
This brief chronicle of the statutory development of Ohio's ex-
ception to consent provision reflects the legislature's increasing in-
terest in protecting the best interests of the child. The changes that
the legislature has made in the statute have, over time, expanded the
circumstances in which a parent's consent rights are forfeit; thus,
the legislature, after balancing the importance of the rights and in-
terests of the parent with those of the child, has evinced its intent
that those of the child should be paramount.5 7
III. THE NEW STATUTE INTERPRETED
As previously detailed, Revised Code § 3107.07(A) appears to
have made several basic changes in the law concerning parental
consent to adoption. However, appellate court interpretations have
not given effect to those changes.58 The rationale for straying from
the plain meaning of the statute is far from clear;59 however, the
53. In re Adoption of Sargent, 28 Ohio Misc. 261, 266, 272 N.E.2d 206, 210 (C.P. Pre-
ble Co. 1970).
54. In re Biddle's Adoption, 168 Ohio St. 209, 216, 152 N.E.2d 105, 110-11 (1958).
55. See supra note 2.
56. Cf. McDermitt, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 305,408 N.E.2d at 683 (parent of a minor not only
has the duty of support as required by judicial decree, but also has a duty to support under
common law).
57. See, e.g., State ex. reL Booth v. Robinson, 120 Ohio St. 91, 95, 165 N.E. 574, 576
(1929) (promotion of the child's welfare is the primary purpose of legislative acts dealing with
juvenile court action, including adoption statutes).
58. See infra notes 61-163 and accompanying text.
59. One court offered this rationale:
mhe statute provides for cutting off the right of a parent to withhold his consent to
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consequences are obvious. According to the way it has been inter-
preted, section 3107.07(A) does not mean what it says.
A. Failure to Support and Maintain
Under Revised Code § 3107.07(A), one of the grounds for dis-
pensing with the requirement of parental consent is the failure to
provide for the maintenance and support of a child as required by
law or judicial decree.60 However, recent interpretations of this
part of the statute have made it virtually meaningless.
1. In re Adoption of Anthony61
The case of In re Adoption of Anthony involved, among other
things, a determination of whether a father had failed to provide for
the maintenance and support of his children for a period of one
year.62 Anthony, the adopting parent, was married to the natural
mother of the two children he wished to adopt.63 In his adoption
petition, Anthony alleged that the natural father's consent was un-
necessary because the natural father had failed to communicate
with, or to provide maintenance and support for, his children for a
period of one year.'
Arick, the natural father, admitted that he had communicated
with his children only once during the previous year, and that was
merely a chance occasion.65 Arick also admitted that he stopped
making child support payments; he had made only one month's
child support payment during the prior twelve months.66 On the
other hand, Arick claimed that he had justifiable cause for not com-
municating with his children and for failing to make child support
payments. 67 He alleged that there was tremendous animosity be-
tween Anthony and himself, and that Anthony had threatened
the adoption of his child by another, and is in abrogation of the common-law rights
of natural parents, [therefore,] the provisions of the statute must be strictly con-
strued to protect the rights of the natural parent.
In re Adoption of Anthony, 5 Ohio App. 3d 60, 62, 448 N.E.2d 511, 515 (1982). Unfortu-
nately, the courts which have adopted this rationale have forgotten that the primary purpose
for the existence of this adoption statute is to provide for "the best interests of the child." See
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
60. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A).
61. 5 Ohio App. 3d 60, 449 N.E.2d 511 (Franklin Co. 1982).
62. Id. at 60, 449 N.E.2d at 513.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 60-62, 449 N.E.2d at 513-14.
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physical violence when Arick had attempted to visit his children.68
Barred from visiting his children, Arick alleged that he withheld his
child support payments until he was allowed to visit them again.69
Based on these facts, the probate court found that Arick had
failed to: (1) communicate with his children; (2) provide mainte-
nance and support for his children for one year; and (3) establish
justifiable cause for his actions.70 Consequently, the court held that
Arick's consent was not needed.7" Arick appealed, claiming that
the finding of "no justifiable cause" was against the weight of the
evidence, and also that, as a matter of law, he had provided support
and maintenance during the period of one year prior to the adop-
tion petition.72
The appellate court reversed the probate court's decision.73 It
held that the burden of proving no justifiable cause was on the po-
tential adopting parents and not on the nonconsenting parent. 74
The court did not base its decision, however, on this reversible er-
ror.75 Rather, the court held that the payment of only one month's
child support during the previous twelve months was sufficient to
preserve Arick's parental consent rights.76 In so holding, the court
stated that "so long as the parent complies with his duty to support
...for any period during the [immediately preceding year] .. .
then he has not failed to provide support as required by law, or
"177judicial decree ....
The court in Anthony cited two cases to support its interpreta-
tion of section 3107.07(A):78 Johnson v. Varney79 and In re Adop-
tion of Costakos.80 The court did so despite the fact that both cases
were interpreting the statute as it existed prior to the substantial
1976 changes.81 In addition, even under the pre-1976 statute, John-
68. Id. at 61, 449 N.E.2d at 513. In fact, Arick had been beaten by Anthony and his
brothers on a prior occassion. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 61, 449 N.E.2d at 513-14.
71. Id., 449 N.E.2d at 514.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 64, 449 N.E.2d at 516-17.
74. Id. at 62, 449 N.E.2d at 515.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 64, 449 N.E.2d at 515-16. Although the language of the opinion appears to
suggest that there was justifiable cause, that issue was never decided. Id., 449 N.E.2d at 515.
77. Id. at 63, 449 N.E.2d at 515 (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. 2 Ohio St. 2d 161, 207 N.E.2d 558 (1965).
80. No. 73 AP-133 (Franklin App. filed Aug. 21, 1973).
81. Id. slip op. at 3; Johnson, 2 Ohio St. 2d at 162, 207 N.E.2d at 560.
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son does not support the Anthony court's interpretation.
In Johnson, the nonconsenting parent had neglected to visit or
write to her child for three years prior to the filing of the adoption
petition.82 In reviewing the lower court's findings, the Ohio
Supreme Court stated:
[c]omplete failure to give the child any care and attention for
more than two years before the filing of the petition for adoption
would justify a finding that [the nonconsenting parent] willfully
failed to properly maintain the child and would thus do away
with the necessity of securing her consent to his adoption.8 3
Thus, the court held that complete failure to support and main-
tain a child on the part of the nonconsenting parent would be suffi-
cient to disregard his consent rights; it did not hold that there "had
to be complete failure to support and maintain during the then spec-
ified two year period immediately preceding the filing of the peti-
tion"84 in order for a parent's consent rights to be forfeit. As such,
the holding of the Ohio Supreme Court in Johnson fails to support
the Anthony court's interpretation of section 3107.07(A). The hold-
ing of Costakos only supports Anthony in that it also misinterpreted
the Johnson court as requiring a complete failure before parental
rights would be forfeit.8
If the appellate court had simply reversed the probate court be-
cause the burden of proving justifiable cause had been placed on the
wrong party, or had the court simply found justifiable cause, then
the decision would be palatable. Unfortunately, the court did not
do either. Instead, it held that one month's child support out of
every twelve is sufficient to preserve parental consent rights.86 Such
an interpretation severely diminishes the vitality of section
3107.07(A). As a result of the holding in Anthony, in order to
maintain parental consent rights, a parent does not have to provide
enough support for a child to live on-which would appear to be
82. 2 Ohio St. 2d at 162, 207 N.E.2d at 560.
83. Id. at 165, 207 N.E.2d at 561.
84. Anthony, 5 Ohio App. 3d at 63, 449 N.E.2d at 515.
85. In Costakos, No. 73 AP-133, slip op. at 2447, the natural father was granted the
custody of his two children after his divorce from their natural mother. Id. at 2448. The
father remarried and, three years later, his new wife filed for adoption of the children. Id. In
the two years prior to the adoption petition, the natural mother visited the children a total of
several times, never staying more than 10-20 minutes at a time. Id. at 2450. When she
visited, the mother usually brought small gifts for the children. Id. As the result of misread-
ing the holding of Johnson to require a complete failure to maintain and support before con-
sent rights were forfeit, the Costakos court held that the negligible attention of the natural
mother was sufficient to preserve her consent rights. Id. at 2451.
86. Anthony, 5 Ohio App. 3d at 63, 449 N.E.2d at 515.
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what "law or judicial decree" should require; rather, a parent need
only provide one monthly support payment each year, an amount
undoubtedly too small to meet the needs of a child. 7
The anomaly of allowing a parent to preserve his consent rights
by making only one monthly support payment per year may be ben-
eficial for the parent who must pay support. It is tremendously un-
fair, however, for the parent having custody of the child who must
actually support him. If there is a bright side to the holding in
Anthony, it is that the court required at least one monthly payment
per year. In a later case, an Ohio court of appeals required even
less.88
2. In re Adoption of Salisbury 9
As in Anthony, In re Adoption of Salisbury involved the question
of what circumstances constitute the "failure to support" which re-
sults in denial of parental consent rights in adoption proceedings.90
In Salisbury, the court made the finding that two children were be-
ing neglected by their natural parent. 91 As a result, the children
were placed in the home of their maternal grandfather, Salisbury.
92
Later attempts by the court to reestablish the children with their
natural mother were unsuccessful, and the children were returned
to Salisbury by an emergency court order.93 Thirteen months later,
Salisbury filed a petition in probate court seeking to adopt the two
children.94
Salisbury alleged in the adoption petition that the consent of the
natural parents was unnecessary under section 3107.07(A), claim-
ing that neither natural parent had made any contribution to the
support of the children during the year immediately preceding the
filing of the original petition, in spite of the fact that both parents
could work.95 After an initial hearing, the probate court dismissed
the original petition, but allowed Salisbury to file an amended peti-
87. For example, a judicial decree requiring child support payments of $65 per week
would amount to $3380 per year, a relatively small amount. However, afterAnthony, a pay-
ment of $260 ($65 X 4) would fulfill the maintenance and support obligations set forth in the
judicial decree-at least with respect to maintaining one's parental consent rights.
88. See infra notes 89-122 and accompanying text.
89. Salisbury, 5 Ohio App. 3d 65, 449 N.E.2d 519 (1981).
90. Id. at 66, 449 N.E.2d at 521-22.
91. Id. at 65, 449 N.E.2d at 521.
92. Id. at 66, 449 N.E.2d at 521.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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tion.9 6 Approximately three months after the original hearing, a
second hearing was held.97 At this hearing the probate court made
a preliminary announcement that the parent's consent was not nec-
essary. 98 The natural mother protested the decision, alleging that,
at some time after the filing of the original petition, she had made
some meager contribution to child support.99
The probate court made its final decision more than three years
after the original adoption petition was filed. 1° It held that,
although the adoption was in the best interests of the child, the peti-
tion for adoption had to be dismissed. 10 1 The probate court admit-
ted that the natural parents had failed to provide support.10 2
However, the court stated that there was no way of knowing
whether she was aware of her duty to provide support to her chil-
dren.103 As such, the probate court rationalized that it could not be
certain that the natural mother would have failed to provide child
support had she known of her duty. Therefore, the petition was
dismissed."1° In dicta, the court added that if the natural mother,
with knowledge of her duty to support, later failed to provide sup-
port, then Salisbury could petition for adoption of the children and
the mother's consent would not be necessary. 105 Salisbury, how-
ever, decided to appeal the decision.10 6
The court of appeals upheld the probate court's decision on two
very tenuous grounds.10 7 First, the court pointed out that "[t]he
[probate] court did not. . . make a finding that the mother know-
ingly abandoned her children, since it found there was no way to
determine at that time that she was aware of her duty to support
them." ' 8 In effect, the court stated that there was a duty to sup-
port the children, but in order to fail to discharge that duty, the
mother must have actual knowledge of her obligation and still fail
to discharge it. In setting forth its second reason for upholding the
probate court, the appellate court implied that the only way a par-
96. Id. at 65, 449 N.E.2d at 521.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 66, 449 N.E.2d at 521.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 65-66, 449 N.E.2d at 521.
101. Id. at 66, 449 N.E.2d at 521.
102. Id. at 67, 449 N.E.2d at 522.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 66, 449 N.E.2d at 521.
107. Id. at 66-67, 449 N.E.2d at 522-23.
108. Id. at 67, 449 N.E.2d at 522.
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ent can fail to discharge the duty to support is by "abandon-
ment."109 The court stated that the natural mother's consent was
needed because "she made some contribution, although meager, for
the support of her children within the pertinent time span estab-
lished by statute." ' ° In other words, under Salisbury, nothing
short of total abandonment would cause the forfeiture of parental
consent rights.
In reaching its decision, the Salisbury court quoted Anthony to
support its holding.' As was demonstrated earlier, Anthony was
based upon a misinterpretation of prior case law 2 -insofar as the
Salisbury court relied on Anthony to support its conclusion, the
holding of Salisbury is also suspect.
The Salisbury opinion is disturbing in several other ways. As an
initial matter, the discussion concerning "duty to support" and
"knowledge" of that duty appears misplaced. Under the statute
which was replaced by Revised Code § 3107.07(A), consent rights
would be lost if there was a "willful" failure to support a child."
13
In interpreting that earlier statute, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that there had to be knowledge of the duty to support, combined
with a failure to support, in order for there to be a willful failure." 4
Clearly, under that earlier statute, the actual outcome of Salisbury
was correct. However, that earlier statute was not in effect at the
time of the hearing." 5 "Willful" failure had been replaced by fail-
ure "without justifiable cause.""' 6 Therefore, the question should
not have been: "Does the parent know of the duty to support?"
Rather, it should have been: "Is it justifiable for a parent to be
unaware of the duty to support his child; and, if so, was the failure
to provide support based on that lack of awareness?"
109. The court did not expressly hold that abandonment was necessary in order to fail to
provide support to children. However, the court's use of the word "abandoned," combined
with the holding that a "meager" support payment discharges the duty to support, strongly
suggests that abandonment will be required before consent is to be dispensed with in future
adoption proceedings. See id at 67, 449 N.E.2d at 522-23.
110. Id. at 67, 449 N.E.2d at 523.
Ill. Id.
112. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
114. In re Adoption of Biddle, 168 Ohio St. 209, 152 N.E.2d 105 (1958) (if a parent
knows of the duty to support and voluntarily and intentionally fails to provide it, there is
willful failure).
115. Revised Code § 3107.07(A) became effective on January 1, 1977. 1976 Ohio Laws
1839. The adoption petition in the case was originally filed on September 7, 1978. Salisbury,
5 Ohio App. 3d at 65, 449 N.E.2d at 521.
116. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A). See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying
text.
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Another disturbing aspect of Salisbury is the court's use of the
word "abandonment." ' 1 7 As stated earlier, that term has not been
a part of the Ohio adoption statute for over fifty years;' 18 it has no
place in an interpretation of section 3107.07(A).
Finally, the court's decision not only takes the life out of the
"failure to support" requirement of section 3107.07(A) by holding
that any "meager" amount of support will be sufficient to preserve a
parent's consent rights, it also flies in the face of the patent legisla-
tive intent that the interests of the child be paramount to those of
the parent. 19 The Salisbury court's indication that maintenance of
parental consent rights be the primary interest protected in an adop-
tion proceeding is evinced in two ways: the statement that its con-
struction of the statute "favors the parent,"1 20 and the court's
refusal to dispense with the natural mother's consent in spite of the
probate court's finding that "the best interests of the children would
be served by having them remain with [Salisbury]." '121 The court
rationalized its holding by stating that:
[T]his is an adoption proceeding which involves the actual termi-
nation of the parent-child relationship. Therefore, the parents'
rights are materially more crucial in an adoption than in a cus-
tody action. Further, since the children are not in [the natural
mother's] custody, their welfare is not actually in jeopardy. 122
It is difficult to conceive of any situation in which a nonconsent-
ing parent will be unable to safeguard his parental rights when any
"meager" amount will suffice; thus, the holding of Salisbury has
evicerated the "maintenance and support" requirement of section
3107.07(A).
It has been demonstrated that the interpretations of section
3107.07(A) provided in Anthony and Salisbury have severely
strained the plain meaning of the language used in the statute. A
parent who does not want to pay a substantial amount of the neces-
sary child support, but who does not want someone else to adopt his
child, 123 need only make a "meager" contribution,1 24 or at most one
month's support payment per year,1 25 in order to make the "failure
117. Salisbury, 5 Ohio App. 3d at 67, 449 N.E.2d at 522.
118. See supra text following note 56.
119. Salisbury, 5 Ohio App. 3d at 67, 449 N.E.2d at 523.
120. Id. at 67, 449 N.E.2d at 523.
121. Id. at 66, 449 N.E.2d at 521.
122. Id. at 67, 449 N.E.2d at 523.
123. When a child is adopted, all rights and obligations of the natural parents towards the
child are terminated. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15.
124. See supra note 109-10 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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to provide support" phrase inoperative. Allowing this extremely
narrow interpretation of section 3107.07(A) is contrary to the clear
intent of the framers of this statute-to provide a statutory frame-
work for dispensing with the requirement of parental consent when
it would be in the best interests of the child-because it would be
virtually impossible to meet the necessary requirements. Of course,
it should be remembered that section 3107.07(A) provides two cir-
cumstances in which parental consent can be ignored. 26 The first
situation-failure to support-has not survived judicial interpreta-
tion. 2 7 As will be seen, the second situation-failure to communi-
cate-has not fared any better. 28
B. Failure to Communicate Without Justifiable Cause
Revised Code § 3107.07(A) provides a second circumstance in
which a parent can lose his parental consent rights. If, for one year,
a parent fails without justifiable cause to communicate with his
child, then that parent's consent will not be required in order to
proceed with an adoption.' 29 This provision is new to the parental
consent statute, and only one appellate court decision has inter-
preted it.'30 In the case of In re Adoption ofHupp,' the children's
stepfather, Hupp, wished to adopt them. Hupp filed an adoption
petition alleging that the natural father's consent was not needed
because of his failure to communicate with his children without jus-
tifiable cause for one year.'3 2 The natural father admitted that he
had not seen his children during the previous year, but he alleged
that he had sent Christmas cards and a small gift to the children
during the year.' 33 Moreover, he argued that his failure to visit his
children was justified because "his ex-wife and [Hupp] had turned
the children against him." 134
The natural mother admitted that she did not want her children
to see their natural father. 13 She also admitted threatening the nat-
ural father, telling him that she would seek an order increasing
126. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A).
127. See supra notes 61-125 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 129-97 and accompanying text.
129. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A).
130. In re Adoption of Hupp, 9 Ohio App. 3d 128, 130, 458 N.E.2d 878, 882 (Cuyahoga
Co. 1982).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 129, 458 N.E.2d at 881.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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child support if he tried to see the children.1 36 Finally, she ac-
knowledged the fact that the children did receive some Christmas
cards and a small gift from their natural father during the prior
year. 137
Based on these facts, the probate court determined that the nat-
ural father's consent was not necessary.1 38 It held that the natural
father had failed to communicate with the children, and that there
was no justifiable cause for that failure.1 3 9 The natural father ap-
pealed, arguing that the probate court had erred in determination of
what constituted "failure to communicate" and "without justifiable
cause."
, 140
The appellate court reversed the probate court and found that
the natural father's consent was necessary because the father had
not failed to communicate with his children within the meaning of
section 3107.07(A). 141 The court pointed out that there were no
prior Ohio appellate court cases defining "failure to communi-
cate."' 42 As a result, the Hupp court looked to the Alaska Supreme
Court's interpretation of the same phrase in the Alaska adoption
statute. 43 In the case of In re Adoption of K.M.M., " the Alaska
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 130-31, 458 N.E.2d at 880, 882-83.
142. Id. at 130, 458 N.E.2d at 882.
143. Id.
144. 611 P.2d 84 (Alaska 1980). There are some problems with the court citing this case.
First, the father in K.M.M. had faithfully sent Christmas cards, birthday cards and letters to
his children prior to the filing of the adoption petition. Id. at 88. He was forced to send cards
because the natural mother had no phone. She had married and was living with the father's
best friend, so personal visits were unrealistic. Id. Finally, the father's work had kept him
away for long periods of time, so cards and letters were the only feasible means of communi-
cation. Id. It is also interesting to note that the children had been scheduled to stay with
their father for six weeks, but the mother cancelled the visit when her new husband filed the
adoption petition. Id. Also, the Alaska adoption statute was different from the Ohio statute.
Alaska's statute stated that parental consent was not needed when a parent failed significantly
to communicate meaningfully with a child. ALAsKA STAT. § 20.15.050(a) (1985) (emphasis
added). This difference in the statute, combined with the difference in the fact pattern, makes
the use of this case suspect. Hupp, 9 Ohio App. 3d at 133, 458 N.E.2d at 885 (Patton, J.,
dissenting).
The dissent in Hupp also pointed out that Hawaii has an adoption statute similar to
Ohio's; no modifiers are used to describe the type of communication or the type of failure
(i.e., meaningful or significant). Id. Thus, it would appear more suitable to refer to a Hawaii
case in interpreting the Ohio statute. In the case of In re Adoption of Male Child, 56 Hawaii
412, 539 P.2d 467 (1975), the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in dicta, suggested that they "might
deem a single card, a single brief letter or note, or a single telephone call to a child within a
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Supreme Court made the determination that" 'presents, cards, and
letters' were acts which 'communicate meaningfully'" within the
meaning of its adoption statute. 145 Citing the Alaska case for sup-
port, the Ohio appellate court held that there is a failure to commu-
nicate "only if there has been a complete failure to communicate, in
the nature of complete abandonment of current interest in the
child." 146
After discussing "failure to communicate," the court examined
the meaning of the phrase "justifiable cause." The court disposed of
this issue summarily, stating that "'without justifiable cause' is
equivalent in meaning and effect to . . 'willfully failed' "147-- the
very words the legislature had taken out when "without justifiable
cause" was inserted.1 41 With that determination, the court looked
to pre-1977 cases to find the meaning of "willfully failed,"14 9 and
concluded that it meant "voluntarily and intentionally."1 50 Finally,
the court considered cases decided under the present statute1 51 and
determined that it had not been established that the father's acts
were "without justifiable cause."152 As a result, the court allowed
him to retain his parental consent rights.1 53
Although the court in Hupp reached the proper result, it re-
wrote Revised Code § 3107.07(A) in doing so. Before the Hupp
case, the statute provided that parental consent rights would be for-
feit if a "parent failed without justifiable cause to communicate"
with a child.'5 4 After Hupp, however, the statute has been reinter-
preted to mean that parental consent can be dispensed with only if a
two year period de minimus or mere token communication .... IaM at 419, 539 P.2d at
471.
145. KM.M., 611 P.2d at 88.
146. Hupp, 9 Ohio App. 3d at 130, 458 N.E.2d at 882.
147. Id. at 131, 458 N.E.2d at 883.
148. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
149. Hupp, 9 Ohio App. 3d at 131, 458 N.E.2d at 883. The cases the court cited were In
re Adoption of Biddle, 168 Ohio St. 209, 152 N.E.2d 105 (1958), and In re Adoption of
Lewis, 8 Ohio St. 2d 25, 222 N.E.2d 628 (1966). Admittedly, these cases are Ohio Supreme
Court cases, but they interpret a statute which no longer exists. See supra notes 41-57 and
accompanying text.
150. Hupp, 9 Ohio App. 3d at 132, 458 N.E.2d at 883.
151. Id. The cases cited by the court are two unreported cases decided after 1977. The
court gives no indication why it looked at pre-1977 cases in order to define "without justifi-
able cause," but looked to post-1977 cases in order to apply "without justifiable cause."
152. Id.
153. Id. at 132,458 N.E.2d at 884. The court gives no indication as to why it decided the
"without justifiable cause" issue when it had already decided that there was no failure to
communicate.
154. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A).
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parent "willfully abandoned" a child.155 Consequently, a few cards
sent during the course of a one-year period will prevent parental
consent rights from being lost. 156
Rather than implicitly rewriting the statute, Hupp could have
reached the same result under the express terms of the statute. The
court could have deemed the mother's threat of increased child sup-
port as justifiable cause for the father's failure to communicate with
his children. This reasoning would have avoided distorting the stat-
ute. By holding that "without justifiable cause" signified "willful
failure,"' 57 the court negated the legislative intent behind Revised
Code § 3107.07(A). The earlier statute used the words "willful fail-
ure."1 5 8 If the legislature had meant to keep this element as a part
of the statute, it would have left that segment of it unchanged.
However, the legislature chose to use different terms. 159 It follows
naturally that the legislature intended a different meaning, and the
court should have respected that intent.
If the court in Hupp had used the proper "justifiable cause"
analysis, rather than deciding that sending a few cards was not
"failure to communicate," then the court could have strengthened
section 3107.07(A). Interpreting "communication" as more than
sending a few cards during the year would have put a significant
duty on parents in order to maintain parental consent rights. This
is exactly what section 3107.07(A) appeared to do when enacted."6
Unfortunately, the court did not place a meaningful duty on par-
ents; instead, Hupp finished what Anthony and Salisbury started; 161
Revised Code § 3107.07(A) is now meaningless. As stated earlier,
there is no failure to support as long as a "meager" contribution to
child support is made. 62 After Hupp, there is no failure to commu-
nicate as long as a few cards are sent each year to a child.163
IV. THE COMPLETE DEMISE OF THE CONSENT EXCEPTION
In August of 1985, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided In re
Adoption of Holcomb.' 6  This case dealt with the meaning of the
155. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 4849 and accompanying text.
159. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A).
160. See supra notes 41-57 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 61-128 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
164. 18 Ohio St. 3d 361, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985).
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phrase "failure to communicate" in Revised Code § 3107.07(A). In
Holcomb, Edmund Holcomb (Holcomb) and Gloria Holcomb (re-
spondent) were granted a divorce after approximately ten years of
marriage. 65 Originally, respondent was granted custody of the
couple's two children, but two years after the divorce Holcomb filed
a motion for change of custody, which was granted.166
In the years following the change of custody, Holcomb and re-
spondent engaged in an extended game of "hide and seek." 167 Re-
spondent refused to give her address and telephone number to
Holcomb, alleging that she did not want to be harrassed by him. 168
Holcomb, on the other hand, allegedly thwarted respondent's at-
tempts to visit her children. 169 In addition, when Holcomb and his
new wife (petitioner) moved into a new home, they refused to give
respondent their address and telephone number. 170
In 1982, Holcomb and petitioner filed a petition in probate court
seeking to adopt Holcomb's two children. 71  Respondent was
served by publication, allegedly because her "address could not be
ascertained with reasonable diligence."' 172 She did not attend the
adoption hearing and the adoption was granted without her
consent. 173
When respondent discovered that the adoption had occurred,
she filed a motion to have it set aside.174 She alleged that she should
have been given actual notice of the original hearing because her
address was readily obtainable from her parents, both of whom
Holcomb knew. 175  The probate court held a hearing and deter-
165. Id. at 362, 481 N.E.2d at 616. This case was actually a consolidation of two cases,
the second case being In re Adoption of Bradford. For brevity, only the facts of the Holcomb
case will be discussed.
166. 18 Ohio St. 3d at 362, 481 N.E.2d at 616.
167. Id. at 362-63, 481 N.E.2d at 616. This "game" actually began prior to the change in
custody. Holcomb had been granted extended visitation rights for the summer of 1980, but
before he picked up the children, respondent moved to California with them and left no
forwarding address. Id. at 362, 481 N.E.2d at 616. Through the use of a private investigator,
Holcomb was able to find the children. Id. It was after this episode that Holcomb petitioned
for, and was granted, custody of the children. Id.
168. Id. at 362, 481 N.E.2d at 616.
169. Id. at 362-63, 481 N.E.2d at 616.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 363, 481 N.E.2d at 617.
172. Id. It should be noted that when Holcomb petitioned the court for custody of his
two children, service by publication was also used. Id. at 362, 481 N.E.2d at 616.
173. Id. at 363, 481 N.E.2d at 617.
174. Id. Respondent's motion to set aside the adoption was filed almost ten months after
the adoption was granted. Id.
175. Id.
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mined that "although service had been improper, [respondent's]
consent to the adoption was not required because she had failed
[without justifiable cause] to communicate with the children for at
least one year prior to the filing of the petition for adoption." 17
6
Respondent appealed the probate court's decision, and the court
of appeals reversed. 177 The court held that respondent had justifi-
able cause for her failure to communicate with the children; there-
fore, respondent's consent was necessary for the adoption. 178
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals, 179 and in doing so, it attempted to clarify the meaning of
section 3107.07(A). The court prefaced its decision with the state-
ment that section 3107.07(A) "substantially modifies its predeces-
sor."' 180 The court went on to assert that "the legislature intended
to adopt an objective test for analyzing failure of communica-
tion."18' Finally, the court held that the statute should be strictly
construed; therefore, a parent's consent would be necessary to an
adoption unless there was a "complete absence of communication
for the statutorily defined one-year period."'1 2
With these considerations in mind, the court addressed the facts
of the case. It agreed with both the court of appeals and the probate
court that respondent had completely failed to communicate with
the children for a period of over one year. 183 Thus, the case turned
on whether respondent had justifiable cause for the failure.1 "4
Although the court did not establish a precise definition of "jus-
tifiable cause,"18 it held that Holcomb and petitioner "had signifi-
cantly interfered with and discouraged" respondent's attempts to
communicate with the children.'1 6 The Holcombs' moving, their
unlisted phone number, and their failure to provide any means by
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 370, 481 N.E.2d at 622.
180. Id. at 366, 481 N.E.2d at 619. The court noted that "former R.C. 3107.06(B)(4)
...authorized adoption without consent by a parent who '. . . willfully failed to properly
support and maintain the child for a period of more than two years immediately preceding
the filing of the petition. . . .' Under the new [statute, however], a parent forfeits his or her
right to object to an adoption if that parent failed to communicate with the child for the lesser
period of one year prior to the filing of the adoption petition." Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 366-67, 481 N.E.2d at 619.
183. Id. at 368-69, 481 N.E.2d at 621.
184. Id. at 369, 481 N.E.2d at 621.
185. Id. at 367, 481 N.E.2d at 620.
186. Id. at 369, 481 N.E.2d at 621.
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which respondent might be able to communicate with her children
showed "a significant, deliberate, and concerted effort. . to inter-
fere with respondent's communication with her children.
18 7
Therefore, respondent's failure to communicate with her children
was justifiable.18 8
In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that it "in no way
condone[d] the actions of the uncaring, unworthy, or unscrupulous
parent who, after a period of sustained absence, makes an infre-
quent communication for the sole purpose of frustrating or prevent-
ing adoption."' 8 9 Instead, the court believed that it was paying
"due deference" to the perceived legislative intent to protect the
"fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody
and management of their children."' 90
The court cited Santosky v. Kramer"'9 in support of its determi-
nation that "failure to communicate" must be strictly construed in
order to effectuate the legislature's intended protection of natural
parents' fundamental liberty interests as mandated by the Constitu-
tion. 192 However, Santosky merely holds that when parental rights
are being terminated in a judicial proceeding, the standard of proof
that is required by due process is at least "clear and convincing evi-
dence."' 19 No mention is made in the case that adoption statutes
must be strictly construed. In addition, the standard of "clear and
convincing evidence" for adoption proceedings in which parental
consent has been deemed waived is the established norm in Ohio.
194
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 367, 481 N.E.2d at 619. Although the court may not condone this, the deci-
sion makes it possible. Of course, a meager amount of child support will also be necessary in
order for parental consent rights to be kept intact. See supra note 109 and accompanying
text.
190. Id., citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
191. 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
192. 18 Ohio St. 3d at 367, 481 N.E.2d at 619. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
193. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48. At issue in Santosky was a New York statute which
allowed parental rights to be terminated upon a showing that the child was "permanently
neglected." Id. at 747. However, the statute also provided that the standard of proof was
only "preponderance of the evidence." Id.
194. See Anthony, 5 Ohio App. 3d at 62, 449 N.E.2d at 515 (standard of proof required in
Ohio adoption proceedings is "clear and convincing evidence"); Holcomb, 18 Ohio St. 3d at
365-67, 481 N.E.2d at 619 (in Ohio "clear and convincing evidence" is the standard of proof
in adoption cases). The Holcomb court suggested a comparison with Revised Code
§ 2151.35, which states, in part:
If the court finds from clear and convincing evidence that the child is an abused,
neglected, or dependent child, or finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the child is a
delinquent or unruly child or a juvenile traffic offender, the court shall proceed
immediately, or at a postponed hearing, to hear evidence as to the proper disposi-
369
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Therefore, the Santosky requirements have already been satis-
fied. 195 As such, the Ohio Supreme Court's citation of Santosky to
justify strict construction of section 3107.07(A) is misplaced.19 6
As a result of the Ohio Supreme Court's misguided concern
with protecting the due process rights of parents in adoption pro-
ceedings, the court in Holcomb has approved of the decisions in
Anthony, Salisbury and Hupp. Consequently, the emasculation of
Revised Code § 3107.07(A) is now complete and binding upon the
courts of Ohio. 1
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V. A SUGGESTED SOLUTION
Although Revised Code § 3107.07(A) has been interpreted into
a virtual nullity, 198 it is possible to salvage the intent of that sec-
tion. 199 However, to do so, the Ohio state legislature must amend
the statute.2 'o This Note suggests that the state legislature adopt
the following proposed section 3107.07(A).2 °1 Its language is con-
tion to be made under sections 2151.352 to 2151.355 of the Revised Code. If the
court does not so find, it shall order that the complaint be dismissed and that the
child be discharged from any detention or restrictions theretofore ordered.
18 Ohio St. 3d at 368 n.2, 481 N.E.2d at 620 n.2 (emphasis added).
195. This Note is not suggesting that ifSantosky is satisfied, then all due process require-
ments have been satisfied. Rather, this Note merely suggests that the Ohio Supreme Court's
reliance on Santosky is misguided.
196. There are other constitutional cases which deal with the issue of termination of pa-
rental rights. However, those cases also fail to justify the court's decision. For example,
Armstrong v. Manzo, 388 U.S. 545 (1982), held that due process requires a natural parent to
be given prior notice of a judicial proceeding which might terminate his parental rights. In
Ohio, that requirement is fulfilled by Revised Code § 3107.11(A), which states:
After the filing of a petition to adopt. . . a minor, the court shall fix a time and
place for hearing the petition. . . . At least twenty days before the date of hearing,
notice of the filing of the petition and of the time and place of hearing shall be given
by the court to all of the following: . . . (3) A person whose consent is dispensed
with upon any ground mentioned in divisions (A), (E), (F) or (G) of section 3107.07
of the Revised Code, but who has not consented.
OHIO REV. CODE § 3107.11(A). Because Ohio provides for notice and a hearing, the due
process requirement of Armstrong is satisfied.
197. As this Note argues, Anthony, Salisbury and Hupp have made Revised Code
§ 3107.07(A) virtually meaningless. Holcomb intensifies that effect because that decision is
binding upon all lower courts.
198. See supra notes 61-197 and accompanying text.
199. The intent of section 3107.07(A), as this Note argues, is to provide a mechanism by
which parental consent rights may be dispensed with when circumstances so warrant. See
supra notes 41-57 and accompanying text. Ohio courts do not appear to disagree with this
proposition but do disagree with the circumstances under which the section becomes
operative.
200. The Ohio Supreme Court has made a determination concerning the meaning of sec-
tion 3107.07(A), and lower courts are bound by that determination. See supra notes 164-97
and accompanying text.
201. This proposed section 3107.07(A) is not based on any single, cognizable source.
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sistent with the remainder of Ohio's adoption statute,2 "2 and it has
been tailored so that it can be placed directly into Revised Code
§ 3107.07 without change.20 3
§ 3107.07 [Who need not consent.]
Consent to adoption is not required of any of the following:
(A) A parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption peti-
tion and the court finds after proper service of notice and hearing,
that the parent has substantially failed without just cause, for a pe-
riod of at least 12 months, either to communicate meaningfully with
the minor; or to visit with the minor; or to provide for the mainte-
nance and support of the minor (1) as is commensurate with the par-
ent's ability or (2) if there is a judicial decree, as is required by the
judicial decree. In determining whether there has been a substantial
failure under this subsection, the court shall disregard token or iso-
lated visits, communications or contributions to maintenance and
support. Failure for 12 months to provide at least 70% of any court
ordered child support for that 12-month period shall constitute a sub-
stantial failure to provide maintenance and support for a minor for a
12-month period.
The proposed section 3107.07(A) is intended to operate as
follows:
(1) A party wishing to utilize this section must allege in an
adoption petition that there has been a substantial failure without
just cause to do any one or more of the listed acts.
(2) The court will hold a hearing at which the allegations must
be proven by at least clear and convincing evidence.2"4 If this is
done, then:
(3) The party against whom this section is being used will have
the opportunity to show that the allegations are false, or else that
there was just cause for any substantial failure that did occur.
(4) If the court finds that there has been no substantial failure,
then the court may not dispense with the consent of the parent. If
Rather, various sources were read and analyzed, and the final form of the proposed section
draws the better elements from them in order to create the most useful section possible. The
sources consulted in order to draft this proposed section were:
A. Draft ABA Model State Adoption Act, 19 FAM. L.Q. 103 (Summer 1985).
B. UNIFORM ADOPTION Acr, § 6, 9 U.L.A. 19 (1979).
C. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A).
D. Act of July 17, 1959, § 1, as amended, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1501 (1980).
202. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07.
203. The italicised portion of the proposed section is the new language proposed by this
Note.
204. See supra notes 193, 194 and accompanying text.
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the court finds that there has been a substantial failure, but that
there is just cause, then the court may not dispense with the consent
of the parent; however, if the court does not find that there is just
cause, then the court may dispense with the consent of the parent.
The proposed section is intended to accomplish two goals: (a)
provide a means for dispensing with parental consent when circum-
stances so warrant; and (b) safeguard parental consent rights when
it would be unjust for those rights to be taken away. The first goal
is accomplished by providing that a substantial failure to do certain
listed acts will be grounds for dispensing with parental consent.
The second goal is accomplished by providing that parental consent
rights will remain intact if a parent has just cause for any substan-
tial failure that has occurred.
The phrase "just cause" is not defined. It is to be a question of
fact for the court to determine after looking at all of the
circumstances.
Similarly, the phrase "substantially failed" is not defined. It is a
question of fact for the court to determine, except in one situation.
When there exists a judicial decree which requires a certain amount
of child support to be paid, at least 70% of that amount per year
must be paid, or else, as a matter of law, there will be a substantial
failure to provide maintenance and support for a child. In such a
situation, the issue becomes whether the substantial failure was with
just cause. 20 5 This provision is intended to prevent decisions such
as Anthony and Salisbury.20 6
The word "failed" is modified by the adverb "substantially" in
order to make it clear that there need not be a complete failure in
order for parental consent rights to be dispensed with. A less-than-
complete failure will be sufficient, and the court will concentrate on
the issue of just cause. Thus, the decision in Hupp will be legisla-
tively modified.20 7
Finally, the proposed section mandates that a court disregard
incidental or token visits, communications, or contributions to
205. As an illustration:
A is ordered to pay $25 per week in child support to B. That would amount to $1300 per
year ($25 X 52). If A pays less than 70% of $1300 (ie., $910) during a 12-month period,
then A will have substantially failed to provide maintenance and support as a matter of law.
A court would then inquire into the reasons for the substantial failure in order to determine
whether there is just cause for the substantial failure.
206. The final decisions might not be different, but rather than finding no substantial
failure, a court will have to find just cause for the substantial failure under the facts of those
cases. See supra notes 61-128.
207. See supra notes 129-63 and accompanying text.
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maintenance and support when the court is determining whether
there has been a substantial failure. Instead of using incidental con-
tacts to find that there has been no substantial failure, a court will
turn to the issues of just cause. This mandate will prevent decisions
such as Anthony, Salisbury, Hupp and Holcomb.20 8
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has demonstrated that recent interpretations of Ohio
Revised Code § 3107.07(A) have made that statute virtually mean-
ingless.20 9 Moreover, because the Ohio Supreme Court has made a
final determination regarding the interpretation of this statute,10
judicial reinterpretation is unlikely. Therefore, any solution to the
judicially created problem must come from the legislature.
This Note has suggested the enactment of a new section
3107.07(A), z1' which, although limited in its scope, would provide a
legislative solution. The proposed section would allow natural par-
ents to safeguard their own parental rights, and provide a method
by which parental consent rights could be dispensed when the cir-
cumstances so warrant. Thus, a balancing of the rights of the par-
ents, the needs of the child, and the interest of the state would be
achieved.
CHARLES R. PINZONE, JR.
208. See supra notes 61-197 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 58-163 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 164-97 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
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